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A “CRITICAL” QUESTION OF STATE LAW:
GEORGIA’S AMBIGUOUS TREATMENT OF
INITIAL APPEARANCE HEARINGS AND THE
IMPLICATIONS OF BAIL REFORM
Anne Miller Reynolds*
The Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution
guarantees criminal defendants the right to counsel at
critical stages of a proceeding. While the U.S. Supreme
Court has not addressed whether initial bail hearings
are critical stages of a proceeding, several states have
elected to provide greater protection for criminal
defendants by holding that bail hearings are critical
stages. However, Georgia has avoided this question, as
Georgia has held that initial appearance hearings, in
which questions of bail are often decided, are “not often”
critical stages of a proceeding. Logically, it follows that
initial appearance hearings must sometimes be critical
stages of a proceeding. This Note argues that initial
appearance hearings, insofar as they encompass
questions of bail, should be considered critical stages. In
so doing, this Note examines Georgia’s history of
providing greater protection to criminal defendants than
the federal government and the implications of bail
reform.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A criminal defendant in Georgia enters the courtroom for her
initial appearance. During this appearance, a judicial officer will
address issues of bail and schedule a date for a commitment
hearing.1 If the crime that the accused is charged with is not one for
which bail must be set by a superior court judge, then the judicial
officer will set bail.2 The setting of this defendant’s bail is crucial;
although some defendants may find it easy to post whatever bail the
judicial officer sets, this particular defendant may not be able to
afford a bond that is too high and may consequently be forced to stay
in jail for a much longer period of time.
Situations such as these are far too common in the United States
today.3 For some criminal defendants, bail hearings pose little
problem—these defendants may not be wealthy, but they have the
means to post whatever bail the judge may set. However, for many
indigent defendants, bail can be unaffordable.4 Thus, bail hearings
can determine whether these defendants will have to remain
imprisoned for even relatively minor charges, such as drug
possession, or if they can go free, as do many other defendants at
this stage of a criminal proceeding.5 Very few jurisdictions currently
ensure representation at bail hearings, which means that most of

1 See O.C.G.A. § 17-4-26 (2019) (describing the required actions of officers and the
required sequence of procedures after arresting individuals). A “commitment hearing” in
Georgia is essentially another term for a preliminary hearing. See id. § 17-7-20 (explaining
that a judicial officer determines the time and place of a court of inquiry).
2 See O.C.G.A. § 17-6-1 (2019) (listing offenses for which only a superior court judge can
set bail, and providing that all other offenses are bailable by a judicial officer); 9A LONNIE E.
GRIFFITH, JR., GEORGIA PROCEDURE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 7:24 (2019) (describing the
various steps and procedures in a criminal defendant’s initial appearance).
3 See Wendy Sawyer, How Does Unaffordable Money Bail Affect Families?, PRISON POL’Y
INITIATIVE (Aug. 15, 2018), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2018/08/15/pretrial/ (“Every
day, 465,000 people are held in local jails even though they have not been convicted.”).
4 See Rhonda Cook, Atlanta Mayor Signs New Ordinance Changing Cash Bail System in
a Nod to the Needy, ATLANTA J. CONST. (Feb. 6, 2018, 3:45 PM),
https://www.myajc.com/news/local/atlanta-council-oks-changes-cash-bail-system-nod-theneedy/SW50dABJAtWgBwpB4vtgBN/ (“There are poor people who don’t have resources to
get out of jail.”).
5 See id. (describing how, prior to the City of Atlanta’s elimination of the cash bond
requirement for some low-level offenders, individuals had to stay in jail when they could not
afford bail).
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the time these defendants must navigate this critical bail process
alone.6
The Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution guarantees a
criminal defendant the right to counsel in all adversarial
proceedings7 but only once “formal judicial proceedings” have
actually begun.8 And, even after such proceedings begin, a criminal
defendant is only entitled to the assistance of counsel at “critical”
stages of judicial proceedings.9 Likewise, the Constitution of the
State of Georgia guarantees criminal defendants the right to the
assistance of counsel.10 Georgia courts have applied an analysis
similar to that of federal courts in determining when this
constitutional provision is applicable. In applying that analysis,
courts typically find that defendants only possess the right to have
counsel present at “critical” stages of a criminal proceeding.11
Although the right to counsel is guaranteed at both the state and
federal level, this right does not automatically attach upon the
moment of arrest; instead, it attaches when certain conditions in
criminal proceedings have been satisfied.12 And, unfortunately for
our hypothetical defendant, it is unclear whether she is entitled to
the right to have counsel present during bail hearings. Her right to
counsel may entirely depend on the jurisdiction in which she is
initially brought before a judicial officer or magistrate.
Currently, it is unclear whether criminal defendants are entitled
to representation at bail hearings pursuant to either the Sixth
Amendment or the Georgia Constitution. This Note will argue that
Georgia courts’ application of the right to counsel is unacceptably
(and perhaps unconstitutionally) vague with respect to bail
6 See Alexander Bunin, The Constitutional Right to Counsel at Bail Hearings, 31 CRIM.
JUST. 23, 23 (2016) (discussing the few jurisdictions that provide counsel at the initial bail
hearing).
7 See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”).
8 See Rothgery v. Gillespie Cty., 554 U.S. 191, 211 (2008) (noting that the point at which
the right to counsel attaches is when formal judicial proceedings have begun).
9 See Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778, 786 (2009) (noting that the right to counsel only
applies to “critical” stages of a proceeding).
10 See GA. CONST. art. I, § I, para. XIV (“Every person charged with an offense against the
laws of this state shall have the privilege and benefit of counsel.”).
11 See, e.g., O’Kelley v. State, 604 S.E.2d 509, 511 (Ga. 2004) (explaining that the presence
of counsel is required during critical stages of criminal proceedings).
12 See Rothgery, 554 U.S. at 213–14 (Alito, J., concurring) (explaining the U.S. Supreme
Court’s description of the dichotomy between the attachment of the Sixth Amendment right
and the actual right to have counsel present).
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hearings and initial appearances. As a solution, this Note urges
Georgia to affirmatively rule that an initial appearance hearing,
insofar that questions of bail are decided during the hearing, is a
critical stage. This Note will further argue that adopting a
risk-based approach to bail reform would help alleviate the concerns
governments may have about providing such additional
representation. In coming to these conclusions, this Note will
examine right-to-counsel jurisprudence both in states finding that
initial appearances are critical stages of a proceeding and in states
that find they are not. Additionally, this Note will explore
alternative bases for arguing that Georgia’s right to counsel extends
to bail hearings, such as examining whether Georgia has provided
broader constitutional protections to criminal defendants than are
available under federal law. In the course of developing its
conclusion, this Note will gather data regarding representation at
initial appearances in Georgia in various counties across the state.
Part I of this Note will provide a brief overview of the current
state of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, what constitutes a
“critical stage” of a proceeding at the federal level, and Georgia’s
critical stage jurisprudence. Part II of this Note will argue that
initial appearance hearings, at least so far as they involve questions
of bail, should be considered critical stages. In so doing, Part II will
examine empirical data and the approaches of other states. Part II
will additionally rely upon Georgia’s expanded protections in other
areas of criminal law and will propose solutions to this question.
Finally, Part III will conclude that Georgia should affirmatively
decide which initial appearance hearings are critical stages.
A. THE SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO COUNSEL: WHERE’S MY LAWYER?

Although the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution
guarantees criminal defendants the right to counsel, it only does so
for “critical stages.”13 Further, the U.S. Supreme Court has not
ruled on whether bail hearings are critical stages, leaving this area
of law unclear at the federal level.14
1. The Basic Prerequisites and Philosophy of Representation
under the Sixth Amendment.
13
14

See discussion infra Sections I.A.1–2.
See discussion infra Section I.A.3.
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The Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution mandates that
defendants “[i]n all criminal prosecutions” are entitled to counsel to
help with preparing a defense.15 The U.S. Supreme Court has
acknowledged that this right to counsel “attaches at the first formal
proceeding” against a criminal defendant.16 The Court has indicated
that such “attachment” occurs when the government uses “judicial
machinery to signal a commitment to prosecute.”17 However, this
enumeration is deceptively broad—although the general right to
counsel in criminal proceedings may “attach” during certain
proceedings, the actual right to have counsel present does not
necessarily coincide with this attachment.18 Rather, the Court has
made it clear that the attachment of the right to counsel only means
that adversarial proceedings have been initiated, whereas the
actual right to the presence of counsel does not occur until a “critical
stage” of a criminal proceeding.19
2. Critical Stage Jurisprudence.
It is not precisely clear which proceedings are “critical” and
which are not. The factors that determine whether a proceeding is
a critical stage are the factors that demonstrate a “need for counsel’s
presence.”20 More directly, the Court has held that critical stages
are those that may “settle the accused’s fate” and essentially make
the rest of the defendant’s trial a “mere formality.”21 Essentially,
critical stages are those stages at which counsel must be present in
order to preserve the fairness of the trial to the defendant.22 Various
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 181 (1991).
17 Rothgery, 554 U.S. at 211; see also Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 399 (1977) (noting
how the issuance of a warrant, arraignment, and commitment to jail confinement left “no
doubt” that “judicial proceedings” had been initiated against the defendant).
18 See John P. Gross, The Right to Counsel but Not the Presence of Counsel: A Survey of
State Criminal Procedures for Pre-Trial Release, 69 FLA. L. REV. 831, 865 (2017) (citing
Rothgery, 554 U.S. at 212) (describing generally when the Sixth Amendment right to counsel
is applicable).
19 See Rothgery, 554 U.S. at 212 n.16 (“[C]ritical stages [are] proceedings between an
individual and agents of the State . . . that amount to ‘trial-like confrontations,’ [during] which
counsel would help the accused ‘in coping with legal problems or . . . meeting his
adversary’ . . . .” (internal citations omitted)).
20 See id. at 212 (describing when a stage is “critical”).
21 See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224–25 (1967) (defining what is meant by a
“critical stage” of a criminal proceeding); see also Charlie Gerstein, Plea Bargaining and the
Right to Counsel at Bail Hearings, 111 MICH. L. REV. 1513, 1517–18 (2013) (discussing United
States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300 (1973)).
22 Ash, 413 U.S. at 322 (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 239 (1973)).
15
16
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U.S. Supreme Court cases have defined the “critical stage” of a trial
in differing ways. The Court in United States v. Wade expressed a
broad view in asking “whether counsel is necessary . . . to secure the
defendant’s trial rights,” while the Court in United States v. Ash
asked if “counsel is necessary because the stage is sufficiently
trial-like and tricky.”23 But all of the Court’s cases have ultimately
been concerned with whether the effect of withholding the presence
of counsel would result in an “unfair outcome” at trial.24
However, simply saying that a critical stage is any stage at
which the absence of counsel could ultimately affect the fairness of
a trial does not clarify which precise stages of a trial are “critical.”
That is not a bright-line test. Rather, in determining whether
particular stages of a trial are critical, the Court has often had to
look at individual stages of a trial in order to determine whether
that specific stage was “critical” and thus essential to a fair trial.25
For example, in Wade, the Court found that post-indictment lineups
were a critical stage, while in Missouri v. Frye, the Court found that
the negotiation phase of a plea bargain was a critical stage.26 The
Court has also deemed arraignments and post-indictment
interrogations to be “critical.”27
3. Bail Hearings and Critical Stages: The Federal Question.
The U.S. Supreme Court has not yet addressed the question of
whether bail hearings are critical stages requiring the presence of
counsel.28 In Rothgery, the Court acknowledged that the right to
counsel attaches upon “a criminal defendant’s initial appearance
before a judicial officer.”29 However, the defendant in Rothgery did
See Gerstein, supra note 21, at 1517–18 (discussing both cases).
See id. (synthesizing the Court’s perspective from Wade and Ash).
25 Bunin, supra note 6, at 24–25.
26 See Wade, 388 U.S. at 237 (finding that the post-indictment stage is a critical stage);
Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 143 (2012) (“The reality is that plea bargains have become so
central . . . that defense counsel have responsibilities in the plea bargain process . . . that
must be met to render the adequate assistance of counsel that the Sixth Amendment
requires . . . at critical stages.”).
27 See Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 54 (1961) (finding that an arraignment is a
critical stage of a prosecution); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 206 (1964) (finding
that post-indictment interrogations were critical stages); see also Frye, 566 U.S. at 140
(describing generally the U.S. Supreme Court’s critical stage jurisprudence). But see Montejo
v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778, 786 (2009) (noting that the right to counsel can be waived
voluntarily by a defendant after she is read her Miranda rights).
28 Bunin, supra note 6, at 24–25.
29 Rothgery v. Gillespie Cty., 554 U.S. 191, 213 (2008).
23
24
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not complain that his bail was unreasonable and did not complain
about lacking counsel when his bail was originally decided.30 Thus,
the Court did not decide whether bail hearings (or initial
appearances during which questions of bail were addressed)
constituted critical stages for the purposes of the Sixth
Amendment.31
There are certainly avenues for arguing that bail hearings should
be considered critical stages.32 In Coleman v. Alabama, the Court
determined that preliminary hearings, during which a court (1)
determined if there was “sufficient evidence . . . to warrant
presenting [the accused’s] case to the grand jury” and (2) set bail,
constituted a critical stage.33 The Court determined that a number
of factors were influential in finding that there would be
“substantial prejudice to [the] defendant’s rights” without the
assistance of counsel, including an attorney’s ability to
cross-examine and impeach witnesses and prepare a case for
defense at trial.34 Additionally, the Court noted that the presence of
counsel during these hearings would allow the defendant to make
more compelling arguments “on such matters as . . . bail.”35 Thus,
the Court seemed to indicate that assistance on bail issues is a
factor weighing in favor of finding that a particular stage is a critical
stage.36 However, because the issue of representation at bail
hearings has yet to present itself directly to the U.S. Supreme
Court, the question of whether the Sixth Amendment offers a right
to counsel at bail hearings remains unanswered.

Bunin, supra note 6, at 24–25.
See Rothgery, 554 U.S. at 213 (“[A] criminal defendant’s initial appearance . . . where
he learns the charge against him and his liberty is subject to restriction . . . marks the start
of adversary judicial proceedings that trigger attachment of the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel.”); see also Bunin, supra note 6, at 24.
32 See Gerstein, supra note 21, at 1523 (arguing that bail hearings can negatively influence
and prejudice plea bargains and thus should be considered critical stages for the purposes of
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel).
33 399 U.S. 1, 8 (1970).
34 Id. at 7 (quoting United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227 (1967)).
35 Id. at 9.
36 The Court seemed to push back on its Coleman holding in Gerstein v. Pugh, noting that
“[b]ecause of its limited function and its nonadversary character, the probable cause
determination is not a ‘critical stage’ of the prosecution that would require appointed
counsel.” Gross, supra note 18, at 864 (quoting Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 122, 125
(1975)). However, the situation in Gerstein “involved only a determination regarding probable
cause” and did not consider issues of bail. Id. at 865.
30
31

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/glr/vol54/iss1/9

8

Reynolds: A “Critical” Question of State Law: Georgia’s Ambiguous Treatment

2019]

A “CRITICAL” QUESTION OF STATE LAW

371

B. THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN GEORGIA

Like many states, Georgia incorporated several fundamental
rights—including a general right to counsel—into its state
constitution.37 Article 1, Section 1, Paragraph XIV of the Georgia
Constitution states that “[e]very person charged with an offense
against the laws of this state shall have the privilege and benefit of
counsel.”38 Although Georgia’s constitutional provision is worded
somewhat differently than the Sixth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution, Georgia courts analyze the state-level right to counsel
with a framework similar to that used by federal courts.39 Like
federal courts, Georgia courts typically first ask if the right to
counsel has “attached.”40 Next, Georgia courts ask whether a
particular stage is a critical stage of a proceeding—if it is, then a
defendant is entitled to the presence of counsel.41
C. GEORGIA’S CRITICAL STAGE JURISPRUDENCE

1. What Is a Critical Stage?
The Georgia Supreme Court follows the reasoning of federal
courts and has found that the right to counsel attaches “at the first
formal proceeding against an accused.”42 Thus, the Georgia
Supreme Court found that the right to counsel attaches at
proceedings such as initial appearance hearings.43 Additionally, the
Georgia Supreme Court separates the period of attachment and the
period at which the presence of counsel is required—the right to
actually have counsel present does not attach just because the right
See GA. CONST. art. I, § I, para. XIV (detailing Georgia’s constitutional right to counsel).
Id.
39 Oddly enough, Georgia courts sometimes analyze the state’s version of the right to
counsel with little or no reference to the state’s own constitutional provision; instead, Georgia
courts tend to analyze the right to counsel in terms of the rights provided by the Sixth
Amendment. See, e.g., Stone v. State, 674 S.E.2d 31, 33 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009) (discussing the
plaintiff’s Sixth Amendment rights but describing attachment in terms of what the Georgia
Supreme Court has declared). Nonetheless, Georgia is clearly developing its own unique right
to counsel jurisprudence through the foundation of the Sixth Amendment and the basic right
provided by the state constitution.
40 See id. (noting that “attachment” does not necessarily make a stage “critical”).
41 See id. (citing O’Kelley v. State, 604 S.E.2d 509, 512 (Ga. 2004)) (describing how critical
stages of a proceeding require the presence of an attorney).
42 O’Kelley, 604 S.E.2d at 511 (quoting McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 181–82 (1991))
(internal quotations omitted).
43 See id. at 512 (“[An] initial appearance hearing . . . is a formal legal proceeding wherein
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches.”).
37
38
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to counsel attaches during a proceeding.44 Rather, much like at the
federal level, the right to have counsel present arises during critical
stages of a criminal proceeding.45 Under Georgia law, a “critical
stage” of a criminal proceeding is “one in which the defendant’s
rights may be lost, defenses waived, privileges claimed or waived,
or one in which the outcome of the case is substantially affected in
some other way.”46
Several of the factors that Georgia considers in determining
whether a proceeding is “critical” are similar to factors utilized by
federal courts. For example, in holding that preliminary hearings
were critical stages, the court in State v. Houston noted that
cross-examination of the state’s witnesses occurs during these
hearings and that these hearings were conducted with the purpose
of “authoriz[ing] the keeping in custody of one accused with
probable cause of committing a crime.”47 A finding that there was
no probable cause could mean that the defendant would not go to
trial, while the court noted that the inability to effectively “confront
and cross examine prosecution witnesses” would severely
compromise the defendant’s case “on the merits” in a way that
would not happen if there were no witnesses to cross-examine.48
The Georgia Supreme Court has also held that a plea withdrawal
proceeding is a critical stage at which a defendant is entitled to the
presence of counsel.49 In Fortson v. State, the court reasoned that
this proceeding “clearly affected [the defendant’s] substantial
44 See id. (“[T]he attachment of the right to counsel during critical stages of trial
proceedings should not be confused with the right to have counsel actually present at the
hearing wherein the defendant’s desire for counsel is determined.”).
45 See id. (recalling the Supreme Court’s holding that the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel, once attached, applies to critical stages of criminal proceedings).
46 Brewner v. State, 804 S.E.2d 94, 99 (Ga. 2017) (quoting Fortson v. State, 532 S.E.2d
102, 103–04 (Ga. 2000)). Georgia courts define critical stages most frequently in the context
of two situations: (1) when the presence of counsel is required and (2) when the presence of
the defendant is required. See Hammond v. State, 625 S.E.2d 503, 504 (Ga. 2005) (finding “no
harm” with the defendant’s absence from a resentencing hearing). The state’s overall
definition of what a critical stage is, as stated in Brewner, does not seem to change based on
whether the presence of the defendant or counsel is at issue. However, it is possible that the
court’s reasoning for what a “critical stage” is may differ somewhat for cases dealing with
each. Thus, this Note will be careful to distinguish between the two when discussing Georgia
jurisprudence.
47 218 S.E.2d 13, 14–15 (Ga. 1975) (quoting Phillips v. Stynchcombe, 202 S.E.2d 26 (Ga.
1973)).
48 Id. at 15.
49 See Fortson, 532 S.E.2d at 104 (holding that plea withdrawal proceedings are critical
stages).
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rights” because it “included [the] introduction of evidence, advocacy
by the prosecutor, and a determination of whether a guilty plea was
valid.”50 The court additionally noted that these proceedings involve
“intricacies of the law and advocacy by the State against the
defendant.”51 In coming to this conclusion, the Georgia Supreme
Court parted ways with some other states, such as Kansas,
suggesting a willingness to interpret Georgia’s right to counsel more
broadly than how other jurisdictions have interpreted their own.52
Additionally, Georgia courts have held that closing arguments
and the verdict, sentencing, and re-sentencing phases of a trial are
critical stages at which a defendant has the right to the assistance
of counsel.53 In determining whether re-sentencing is a critical
stage, the Georgia Supreme Court considered whether the
particular re-sentencing at issue was a “ministerial act.”54 It held
that those re-sentencing proceedings in which “the trial court has
full discretion to reconstruct the sentence and impose a more lenient
punishment” typically preserve the defendant’s right to have
counsel present.55 However, the right to counsel may not be
preserved if a re-sentencing proceeding is “purely ministerial.”56 A
court may find that a re-sentencing proceeding is “purely
ministerial” if “the defendant’s sentence is mandatory or fixed” in
some way.57 For example, in Hammond v. State, the Georgia Court
of Appeals held that re-sentencing the defendant was ministerial in
nature because the defendant’s sentence was not increased as a
result of the merger of several counts of conspiracy.58
Georgia courts have, in particular instances, shown a willingness
to expand the definition of a “critical stage” beyond that afforded by
Id.
Id.
52 See id. (citing State v. Jackson, 874 P.2d 1138, 1141–42 (Kan. 1994)) (describing
persuasive authority from other jurisdictions).
53 See Tyner v. State, 780 S.E.2d 494, 499 (Ga. Ct. App. 2015) (holding that stages such as
closing arguments and sentencing proceedings are critical); see also Robertson v. State, 635
S.E.2d 138, 139–40 (Ga. 2006) (discussing the history of sentencing and re-sentencing as a
critical stage of a proceeding).
54 See Robertson, 635 S.E.2d at 140 (discussing when re-sentencing is and is not a critical
stage requiring the presence of counsel).
55 See id. (describing a situation in which a defendant retains the right to counsel).
56 See id. (describing a situation in which a defendant does not retain the right to counsel).
57 See id. (noting that a hearing is “purely ministerial” when “the trial court is without
discretion”).
58 625 S.E.2d 503, 504 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005) (discussing the nature of the merging
proceedings).
50
51
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federal critical stage jurisprudence at that point in time.59 In Gibson
v. State, the Georgia Court of Appeals held in a matter of first
impression that restitution hearings were a part of sentencing
proceedings and thus were critical stages of a proceeding so long as
they were not “ministerial.”60 In doing so, the court considered
persuasive authority from a number of other states, ultimately
choosing to adopt the reasoning employed by those courts as its
own.61 In State v. Guadagni, an Arizona case that the court in
Gibson cited as persuasive authority, the Arizona Court of Appeals
noted that a failure to make mandated restitution payments “could
constitute a probation violation and result in jail time or
imprisonment” for the defendant.62 Thus, denying a defendant the
assistance of counsel at these hearings could result in a “potential
loss of liberty.”63 Likewise, in State v. Alspach, the Iowa Supreme
Court held that restitution hearings were critical stages.64 The
Alspach court noted that restitution hearings could result in “court
costs,” “attorney fees,” and “compensation funds” and that the
defendant believed that the restitution in this case was excessive
and that counsel would have allowed him to present a better
argument against such excessive restitution.65
2. What Is Not a Critical Stage?
Georgia courts have limited Georgia’s critical stage
jurisprudence in some instances. For example, habeas corpus
proceedings are not critical stages in Georgia.66 The Georgia
Supreme Court has reasoned that habeas proceedings are
59 Georgia’s decision to define restitution hearings as critical stages came before the
decision of several federal circuits to do so. See Gibson v. State, 737 S.E.2d 728, 730 (Ga. Ct.
App. 2013) (finding that restitution hearings were critical stages); cf. United States v. Pleitez,
876 F.3d 150, 161 (5th Cir. 2017) (holding, as a matter of first impression, that “[t]he entry of
a final restitution order that imposes a more onerous award . . . constitutes a ‘critical stage’
of proceedings”).
60 See Gibson, 737 S.E.2d at 729 (discussing the court’s reasoning for finding that these
hearings were critical stages).
61 See id. at 730 (describing reasoning from courts in Iowa, Arizona, Arkansas, Kansas,
and California, among others).
62 178 P.3d 473, 479 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008).
63 Id.
64 554 N.W.2d 882, 884 (Iowa 1996).
65 Id.
66 See Fortson v. State, 532 S.E.2d 102, 104 (Ga. 2000) (citing Gibson v. Turpin, 513 S.E.2d
186 (Ga. 1999)) (noting that “the right to counsel does not attach” to applications for habeas
corpus).
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considered to be “civil” in nature, rather than criminal, and are
more of a “collateral” attack than “a means for re-litigating a
prisoner’s case.”67 A DUI defendant’s decision whether or not to take
a “breath test” is also not a “critical stage” because officers
administering the test must “advise the driver of his implied
consent rights” and “there is very little that a lawyer could add that
would substantially affect the fairness of the trial.”68
3. Bail Hearings.
In Georgia, initial questions of bail typically arise during the
initial appearance hearing, where the magistrate judge will make
the first decisions regarding whether to set bail or not.69 Although
the right to counsel clearly attaches during initial appearance
hearings, it does not necessarily entail the right to have counsel
present at these hearings.70 Georgia law does address whether
initial appearance hearings are critical stages, but that answer is
unsatisfactory. Georgia courts note that initial appearance hearings
are “not often” critical stages, but the Georgia courts do not say that
they are never critical stages for the purposes of the right to
counsel.71 Otherwise, Georgia courts have not directly addressed the
question of whether a bail hearing is a “critical stage.”72 O’Kelley v.
67 See Turpin, 513 S.E.2d at 188–89 (describing procedures associated with seeking a writ
of habeas corpus).
68 Rackoff v. State, 637 S.E.2d 706, 708–09 (Ga. 2006) (citing State v. Jones, 457 A.2d
1116, 1119 (Me. 1983)).
69 See First Appearance Hearings (Bond Hearings), ATHENS-CLARKE COUNTY UNIFIED
GOV’T, https://www.athensclarkecounty.com/684/First-Appearance-Hearings (last visited
Sept. 22, 2019) (noting how in Athens-Clarke County “first appearance hearings” are known
as “bond hearings”); First Appearance Hearings, MAGISTRATE CT. OF DEKALB COUNTY, GA.,
http://www.dekalbcountymagistratecourt.com/criminal/first-appearance-hearings.asp (last
visited Sept. 22, 2019) (noting how in Dekalb County, judges will set a defendant’s bond when
they are authorized to do so). Magistrate judges are not able to set bond for every offense as
some offenses must have bond set by a superior court judge. Interview with Russell Gabriel,
Professor, University of Georgia School of Law, in Athens, Ga. (Feb. 11, 2019). Many Georgia
counties employ a “bail schedule,” which is a list of pre-set bail amounts for certain offenses.
Id. Individuals may pay this pre-set amount immediately, but if they cannot, they will usually
see a magistrate judge, who can typically raise or lower the bail amount based on factors such
as the charges and the person’s criminal record. Id. This usually happens at the initial
appearance hearing. Id. Despite this, it is important to remember that each Georgia county
will likely run criminal trials somewhat differently, so this may not be the precise process
each county follows. Id.
70 See O’Kelley v. State, 604 S.E.2d 509, 511 (Ga. 2004) (“[An] initial appearance hearing
[is not] often a critical stage of a criminal proceeding . . . .”).
71 See id. (noting that these hearings are “not often” critical stages).
72 See id. (declining to affirmatively decide whether bail hearings are critical stages).
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State is the only Georgia Supreme Court case discussing this issue
in any depth.73 However, in O’Kelley, the court noted that, because
the right to counsel attaches during initial appearance hearings, a
defendant can exercise his or her right to counsel and thus limit the
magistrate’s ability to “conduct further proceedings that would
constitute critical aspects” of the trial.74 Thus, after a defendant
exercises his or her right to counsel, a magistrate can only perform
functions such as scheduling and other “housekeeping” measures.75
4. Georgia Counties Currently Do Not Guarantee the Right to
Counsel at Initial Appearance Hearings.
Under Georgia law, a defendant is entitled to the services of
counsel no later than three business days after the defendant is
arrested or after service is made and the defendant has applied for
counsel.76 It does not appear that many Georgia counties—if any at
all—currently guarantee the right to representation at initial
appearance hearings. In DeKalb County, for example, the first
appearance hearing is held before a magistrate judge, who will set
bond if they are authorized to do so.77 At this hearing, defendants
are informed of their right to counsel and how to apply for legal
representation.78 Bail is set in a similar manner in Athens-Clarke
County.79 In Decatur County, public defenders will typically receive
applications for representation within twenty-four to forty-eight
hours of a defendant’s arrest but do not typically appear to
represent the defendant during the initial setting of bail before a
magistrate.80 In Morgan County, public defenders typically do not
see their assigned defendants until after bond is set.81 Put simply,
73 Id. No lower courts cases appear to have applied O’Kelley in determining that initial
appearance hearings were or were not a “critical stage” of a proceeding.
74 Id. at 512. Presumably, other “critical aspects” of the trial, though not enumerated
directly in O’Kelley, would include those identified in Georgia case law such as those discussed
infra Section II.B.1.
75 O’Kelley, 604 S.E.2d at 512.
76 O.C.G.A. § 17-12-23(b) (2016). A “petition, notice, or other initiating process” can also
trigger the provisions of this statute. Id.; see also Gross, supra note 18, at 842.
77 See First Appearance Hearings, supra note 69.
78 Id.
79 See First Appearance Hearings (Bond Hearings), supra note 69 (describing the process
of setting bail).
80 Telephone Interview with Patrick Chisholm, Assistant Public Defender, South Georgia
Judicial Circuit (Oct. 19, 2018).
81 Telephone Interview with Darel Mitchell, Assistant Public Defender, Ocmulgee Judicial
Circuit (Jan. 14, 2019). Some misdemeanor offenses in this county have pre-set bond
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there does not seem to be any uniform method to how Georgia
counties approach indigent representation.82
II. ARGUMENT
As Georgia has left open the question of which initial
appearance hearings are critical stages, this Note argues that
Georgia should hold that initial appearance hearings encompassing
questions of bail are critical stages. First, this Note will argue that
Georgia’s current approach inevitably leaves some defendants
without constitutionally-required counsel. Next, this Note will look
at approaches employed by other jurisdictions. This Note then
argues that Georgia should find that bail hearings are critical
stages.
A. GEORGIA’S CRITICAL STAGE JURISPRUDENCE IS UNACCEPTABLY
VAGUE

Georgia’s critical stage jurisprudence is alarming for a number
of reasons, but the most concerning reason is that O’Kelley suggests
that sometimes initial appearances are critical stages at which the
presence of counsel is required.83 However, there does not appear to
be any discernable process by which Georgia courts determine when
these initial appearances are critical stages and when they are not.
As there is no blanket rule requiring the presence of counsel at
initial appearances, it is highly likely that some defendants are
unconstitutionally denied the presence of counsel in those counties
that decline to provide counsel in some initial appearance hearings.
B. AREAS OF PERSUASIVE AUTHORITY

Although Georgia has not ruled on which initial appearance
hearings are critical stages, persuasive authority suggests that
initial appearance hearings dealing with discretionary bail
questions should be considered critical stages. For example, Georgia
has, in the past, provided greater protections to defendants than the
amounts. If it is not within the judge’s power to set bond for a particular offense, a separate
hearing may be required. Id.
82 See Douglas L. Colbert, Prosecution Without Representation, 59 BUFF. L. REV. 333, 405
n.371 (2011) (noting that defendants in Butts County could wait as long as twenty-one days,
while those in Rockdale County could wait as few as two days).
83 O’Kelley v. State, 604 S.E.2d 509, 512 (Ga. 2004).
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federal government.84 Additionally, the approaches of other states
and data regarding bail hearings support finding that initial
appearance hearings encompassing questions of bail are critical
stages.85 Finally, current Georgia case law already indicates that
initial appearances hearings are, when dealing with bail, critical
stages.
1. Georgia Provides More Protections in Other Areas of Criminal
Law than the Federal Government.
Although it is unclear whether Georgia provides a right to
counsel during questions of bail at initial appearances, it is clear
that Georgia provides greater protection than the federal
government in other substantive areas of criminal law.86 Thus,
federal law is not a ceiling for Georgia’s state-level protections—
rather, it is a floor, and a floor from which Georgia has a history of
rising above.87
For example, Georgia law provides greater protections against
self-incrimination than the federal government does.88 In Brown v.
State, the Georgia Supreme Court held that defendants accused of
murder were not required by the state constitution to provide
handwriting exemplars.89 That is not the case in federal law, which
provides less protection in this area.90 Additionally, pursuant to
decisions rendered by the U.S. Supreme Court, a defendant’s
privileges against self-incrimination are not violated when the
defendant is forced to give blood or voice samples.91

See discussion infra Section II.B.1.
See discussion infra Sections II.B.1–2.
86 See
Jorge G. Valdes, Developments in State Constitutional Law: 1993; D.
Self-Incrimination, 25 RUTGERS L.J. 1150, 1150 (1994) (discussing Georgia’s deviation from
federal law in certain circumstances).
87 See id. (naming Georgia as a state that has “clearly deviated from federal constitutional
law”).
88 See id. (discussing Georgia’s deviation from federal law in self-incrimination
jurisprudence).
89 426 S.E.2d 559, 562 (Ga. 1993).
90 See Valdes, supra note 86, at 1150. See also Olevik v. State, 806 S.E.2d 505, 516 (Ga.
2017) (“Thus, although Paragraph XVI [of the Georgia State Constitution] refers only to
testimony, its protection against compelled self-incrimination . . . is more extensive than the
Supreme Court of the United States’s interpretation of the right against compelled
self-incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment.”).
91 See Valdes, supra note 86, at 1150 n.97 (citing Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757,
757 (1966); United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 2 (1973)).
84
85
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2. Other States Have Found that Bail Hearings Are Critical
Stages.
Although the Sixth Amendment question of whether criminal
defendants have a right to counsel at bail hearings remains
unanswered by the U.S. Supreme Court, several states have taken
the initiative to offer a guaranteed right to counsel at bail hearings.
For example, in interpreting the Supreme Court’s decision in
Rothgery, courts in both New York and Connecticut concluded that
bail hearings were critical stages.92 Even before Rothgery was
decided, courts in states such as Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and
North Carolina also determined that bail hearings were critical
stages.93
In Hurrell-Harring v. State, the New York Court of Appeals, in
holding that several counties in the state had likely been
unconstitutionally denying indigent defendants the right to have
counsel present, proclaimed that “[t]here is no question that ‘a bail
hearing is a critical stage of the State’s criminal process.’”94 The
defendants filed a class action lawsuit against the State of New
York, alleging that the public defense system was deficient and
deprived defendants within the state of “constitutionally and
statutorily guaranteed representational rights.”95 In particular, in
determining what constitutes a critical stage, the court considered
the defendant’s “loss of employment and housing” and an “inability
to support and care for particularly needy dependents.”96
In ordering a defendant’s bail to be reviewed subject to new
procedural conditions, a New Jersey court in State v. Fann held that
the setting of bail was a critical stage which requires the presence
of counsel in criminal proceedings.97 Fann was arrested for

92 See Bunin, supra note 6, at 24 (describing the various states concluding that counsel is
necessary at bail hearings).
93 Id.
94 930 N.E.2d 217, 223, 227 (N.Y. 2010) (quoting Higazy v. Templeton, 505 F.3d 161, 172
(2d Cir. 2007)); see also Bunin, supra note 6, at 24.
95 Hurrell-Harring, 930 N.E.2d at 219.
96 Id. at 223.
97 See State v. Fann, 571 A.2d 1023, 1024 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1990); see also Douglas
L. Colbert, Thirty-Five Years After Gideon: The Illusory Right to Counsel at Bail Proceedings,
1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 38 (1998) (describing New Jersey’s right to counsel jurisprudence and
the court’s reasoning in State v. Fann). New Jersey’s system has been under attack in the
federal court system but has remained in place so far. See Appeals Court Rules in Favor of
New
Jersey’s
Bail
Overhaul,
NPR
(July
10,
2018,
5:06
AM),
https://www.npr.org/2018/07/10/627588135/appeals-court-rules-in-favor-of-new-jerseys-bail-
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aggravated assault and weapons charges, and the lower court set
bail at $25,000 during his first appearance.98 In determining that
bail hearings were critical stages, the court explicitly noted the
significance of the consequences of pretrial detention faced by those
defendants who could not afford bail.99 Pretrial detention, the court
reasoned, could result in the defendant losing his job or facing the
severe psychological consequences resulting from imprisonment,
and it could detrimentally affect the defendant’s dependent family
members.100 Additionally, the court noted that the pretrial
detention of defendants is linked to an increased chance of the
defendant receiving a criminal conviction or time in jail and that
such pretrial detention was also related to an increased severity in
the defendant’s final sentence.101
3. Data Suggests that Initial Bail Hearings Are Critical Stages.
Several persuasive arguments relying on both policy and data
suggest that bail hearings should be considered critical stages for
purposes of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. For example,
attorneys at bail hearings can “expose fatal weaknesses in the
State’s case,” learn new information about the state’s accusations in
order to better prepare a proper defense, and effectively advocate
for “early psychiatric examination or bail.”102 Likewise,
representation at bail hearings is vital when considered in the
context of the rise in plea bargaining at this stage of a trial. Data
suggests that “pretrial detention puts defendants at a profound

overhaul (“A federal judge Monday ruled in favor of the new system, against the wishes of
the bail bonds industry.”).
98 Fann, 571 A.2d at 1024.
99 See id. at 1026 (discussing the “grave” consequences of pretrial detention).
100 Id. at 1026–27 (citing ABA, STANDARDS RELATING TO PRETRIAL RELEASE 2–3 (Approved
Draft 1968)).
101 See id. at 1026 (citing State v. Johnson, 294 A.2d 245, 251 n.6 (N.J. 1972)). Note,
however, that although New Jersey found the bail hearings were critical stages, the Fann
court thought that “immediate arrangements for representation . . . in connection with the
setting of bail [were] impossible.” Id. at 1030; see also Gross, supra note 18, at 844 n.87.
102 Paul Heaton, Sandra Mayson & Megan Stevenson, The Downstream Consequences of
Misdemeanor Pretrial Detention, 69 STAN. L. REV. 711, 775 (2017) (internal quotations
omitted) (quoting Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 9 (1970) (plurality opinion)) (discussing
the benefits of having counsel at bail hearings). In fact, the U.S. Supreme Court’s reasoning
behind extending its critical stage jurisprudence to preliminary hearings in Rothgery easily
extends to bail hearings. See id. at 774–75 (discussing the applicability of the U.S. Supreme
Court’s reasoning in Rothgery to bail hearings).
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disadvantage in plea negotiations vis-à-vis the position they would
be in if negotiating from freedom.”103
Further, research suggests that the presence and assistance of
counsel at initial bail hearings can have a positive effect on the
defendant’s ultimate outcome and can help reduce the defendant’s
chances of incarceration.104 Empirical research indicates that judges
are more likely to set bail at unaffordable levels when there is no
counsel present.105 It is unlikely that most defendants, particularly
indigent defendants, understand the intricacies of the legal and
factual issues that arise during these hearings.106 Additionally,
hearings for the reconsideration of bail do not necessarily fix the
problem of excessive bail for indigent defendants, as most of the
harm caused by excessive bail stems from immediate issues such as
the defendant’s loss of employment, educational opportunities, and
ability to provide for dependent family members due to the initial
incarceration.107
It is possible that states that have declined to ensure
representation at bail hearings have done so because of a fear of
potentially prohibitive costs and strains on their state budget and
public defense system. However, research indicates that
unnecessary and extended pretrial detention may actually be more
costly for taxpayers than ensured legal representation.108 A 2018
study examined a New York state program that aimed to provide
counsel at initial appearances for misdemeanor offenders and found
that the assistance of counsel can positively influence the decisions
that judges make at these hearings.109 The study found that judges
(1) released individuals with fewer conditions attached and (2)
103 Id. at 776. The authors found, on the basis of an empirical study, that “approximately
17% of the detained misdemeanor defendants who pleaded guilty would not have been
convicted at all but for their detention.” Id.
104 See id. at 776–77 (describing research findings on the presence of counsel at bail
hearings).
105 See Douglas L. Colbert et al., Do Attorneys Really Matter? The Empirical and Legal Case
for the Right of Counsel at Bail, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1719, 1720 (2002) (discussing results
from the Baltimore City Lawyers at Bail Project).
106 Bunin, supra note 6, at 26.
107 Id.
108 See Andrew L. B. Davies et al., Guaranteeing Representation at First Court Appearances
May Be Better for Defendants, and Cheaper for Local Governments, LSE US CENTRE (Aug. 28,
2018),
http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/usappblog/2018/08/28/guaranteeing-representation-at-firstcourt-appearances-may-be-better-for-defendants-and-cheaper-for-local-governments/
(studying the financial impact of pretrial detentions).
109 See id. (discussing the results of the study on pretrial detention).
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imposed fewer “financial barriers” on those who were required to
pay bail, ultimately resulting in fewer pretrial detentions.110 The
authors concluded that lower rates of pretrial detention could
ultimately result in lower costs to taxpayers, as detaining just one
individual could cost upwards of $100 per day.111
C. GEORGIA SHOULD FIND THAT BAIL HEARINGS ARE CRITICAL
STAGES

For Georgia to avoid unconstitutionally denying some criminal
defendants the presence of counsel during certain initial
appearance hearings, Georgia courts should affirmatively hold that
initial appearance hearings are critical stages, insofar that these
hearings entail questions of bail. In the alternative, the Georgia
Supreme Court should enumerate a clear and concise list of factors
that courts can easily use to determine whether a particular initial
appearance hearing is a critical stage. Regardless, this question
needs an answer because it does not appear that Georgia counties
currently guarantee any right to representation at initial
appearance hearings. It also does not appear that Georgia counties
are uniform in their approach to this problem and in how soon
defendants may see an attorney.112 Thus, a defendant may be in jail
for weeks or mere days depending on the county in which he is
arrested.113
1. Georgia Case Law Indicates that Those Stages at Which Bail
Questions Arise Should Be Considered Critical Stages.
Although Georgia has yet to expressly determine whether stages
encompassing bail questions are critical stages, there is room to
argue under existing Georgia case law that bail questions are
encompassed under the critical stage framework laid out in prior
decisions.114 In fact, the Georgia Supreme Court has already
acknowledged that some initial appearances are critical stages,

Id.
See id. (referring to the data collected and charts compiled by the authors which support
the stated conclusions).
112 See discussion supra Section I.C.4.
113 See discussion supra Section I.C.4.
114 See, e.g., O’Kelley v. State, 604 S.E.2d 509, 512 (Ga. 2004) (“[A]n initial appearance
hearing [is] often not a critical stage of a criminal proceeding in its own right . . . .”).
110
111
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although it has declined to define when exactly that occurs.115 Chief
among the reasons suggesting that Georgia courts may be willing to
extend Georgia’s critical stage jurisprudence is their willingness to
depart from the federal framework in several key aspects.116 For
instance, the Georgia Court of Appeals declared restitution
hearings to be critical stages earlier than several federal courts
did.117
Additionally, several factors that Georgia courts have looked at
in order to determine what a critical stage is support finding that
initial appearance hearings that include questions of bail are
critical stages. In particular, Georgia’s emphasis on discretion in
finding that re-sentencing hearings were critical stages is useful, as
initial appearance hearings often involve discretion on the part of
the judge in order to determine when bail is set and at what
amount.118 Further, Georgia’s reliance on U.S. Supreme Court
authority that is favorable to the argument that bail hearings are
critical stages is also telling. Specifically, in deciding that
preliminary hearings were critical stages, Georgia relied heavily on
Coleman v. Alabama, a U.S. Supreme Court case which contains
reasoning that is favorable towards arguing that bail hearings are
critical stages.119
However, the evolution of Georgia’s critical stage jurisprudence
seems to closely mirror that of the federal government—both in the
critical stages it has embraced and in those instances in which it
has scaled back protections.120 This suggests that Georgia is
somewhat tentative in the expansion of its critical stage
jurisprudence and is hesitant to expand too far beyond the scope of
federal protections. Despite this, Georgia’s declaration that initial
appearance hearings are “often not” critical stages is a step beyond
the federal court system’s critical stage jurisprudence and suggests
that Georgia is willing to venture beyond the scope of federal
protections in some instances.121
115 See id. (acknowledging an initial appearance is “a formal legal proceeding wherein the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches”).
116 See discussion supra Section II.B.1.
117 See discussion supra Section II.B.1.
118 See supra Section I.C.1.
119 See State v. Houston, 218 S.E.2d 13, 14–16 (Ga. 1975) (holding that preliminary
hearings are critical stages).
120 See discussion supra Section II.B.1.
121 See O’Kelley v. State, 604 S.E.2d 509, 511–12 (Ga. 2004) (declining to definitively hold
that these hearings are critical stages).
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2. Potential Solutions to Georgia’s “Critical” Problem.
One solution to Georgia’s problem may be to rule that all initial
appearance hearings are critical stages. However, despite the
evidence suggesting that universal representation at these hearings
may be beneficial for states, Georgia may be hesitant to declare that
all initial appearance hearings are critical stages.122 Another
potential way for Georgia to solve this problem would be to
implement bail reform through the use of risk assessment models
which dictate that those defendants at low and moderate risks of
reoffending should be released while those at high risk should be
detained.123 These models are quickly growing in popularity across
the country. For example, a version of a risk assessment model is
currently in use today in Kentucky and a few other states.124
Although there may be some concerns about the need for “costly and
time-consuming interviews” in conjunction with these tools, these
tools are becoming more refined as they receive heightened levels of
attention.125 Any concerns about the use of these tools can easily be
offset by the potential benefit in using them: detaining fewer
individuals will naturally result in lower amounts spent on
detention.126 Additionally, Georgia may consider adopting New
Jersey’s approach to bail reform,127 which has been attributed with
a significantly lower rate of incarceration among indigent
defendants.128 For Georgia, using a tool such as that used in New
Jersey would present a natural solution to the “critical stage”
question—if fewer defendants are being detained, then it is far more

Id. at 512.
See Sandra G. Mayson, Dangerous Defendants, 127 YALE L.J. 490, 510–13 (2018)
(discussing the growing popularity of risk assessment models and the bail reform movement).
124 See id. at 510, 517 (explaining the increase in popularity and adoption).
125 Gross, supra note 18, at 863; see also Mayson, supra note 123, at 516–18.
126 Despite the potential benefits of pretrial risk assessment, the practice is not without
controversy. There is concern that risk assessment algorithms can lead towards racial bias
because of the factors used in calculating risk. See generally Vincent Southerland, With AI
and Criminal Justice, the Devil Is in the Data, ACLU (April 9, 2018, 11:00 AM),
https://www.aclu.org/issues/privacy-technology/surveillance-technologies/ai-and-criminaljustice-devil-data.
127 New Jersey uses a “public-safety assessment” tool to help judges “make a reasoned
decision about detention or release.” Pretrial Justice Reform, ACLU N.J., https://www.aclunj.org/theissues/criminaljustice/pretrial-justice-reform (last visited Nov. 12, 2019).
128 Such results include a “20.3 percent decline in the pretrial jail population” attributed to
the first year of the state’s use of the new bail program. Id.
122
123

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/glr/vol54/iss1/9

22

Reynolds: A “Critical” Question of State Law: Georgia’s Ambiguous Treatment

2019]

A “CRITICAL” QUESTION OF STATE LAW

385

feasible to provide representation for all of these individuals at the
initial appearance.
III. CONCLUSION
The answer to whether initial appearance hearings are a critical
stage in Georgia is unclear under current Georgia law.129 In
Georgia, bail is first set during initial appearances, and the Georgia
Supreme Court has acknowledged that initial appearances are
sometimes critical stages requiring entitlement to the presence of
counsel.130 However, there does not appear to be any current system
in place to determine when initial appearance hearings are critical
stages. Thus, it is likely that some defendants proceed through
these hearings without the presence of counsel to which they are
entitled.
There are several convincing reasons favoring the argument that
initial appearances are critical stages in Georgia. Georgia’s critical
stage jurisprudence exhibits a tentative willingness to extend right
to counsel protections beyond those currently afforded by federal
jurisprudence.131 Likewise, in the past, Georgia has been willing to
extend broader protections than are afforded by the federal
government in other substantive areas of criminal law.132 Finally,
data suggests that the presence of counsel at the initial bail hearing
significantly improves defendants’ chances of a positive final
outcome—showing, as required by Rothgery, a “need for counsel’s
presence.”133
The national spotlight has turned to issues of bail reform,134 and
it is only a matter of time before Georgia will have to deal with the
129 See O’Kelley v. State, 604 S.E.2d 509, 512 (Ga. 2004) (declining to definitively answer
this question).
130 Id. While bail may technically first be “set” by a bail schedule in some counties,
magistrate judges typically have discretion to alter this bail in initial appearance hearings.
Interview with Russell Gabriel, Professor, University of Georgia School of Law, in Athens,
Ga. (Feb. 11, 2019).
131 See discussion supra Section II.B.1.
132 See discussion supra Section II.B.1.
133 See Don’t I Need a Lawyer? Pretrial Justice and the Right to Counsel at First Judicial
Bail Hearing, CONST. PROJECT NAT’L RIGHT TO COUNS. COMMITTEE 17 (2015)
https://constitutionproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/RTC-DINAL_3.18.15.pdf (quoting
Rothgery v. Gillespie Cty., 554 U.S. 191, 212 (2008)). Rothgery, as discussed previously,
suggested that those factors which make a stage “critical” are those that show a “need for
counsel’s presence.” 554 U.S. at 212.
134 See Mayson, supra note 123, at 492.
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“critical stage” question created by O’Kelley.135 Georgia has already
decided that some initial appearances are critical stages. The only
issue, then, is how to decide which of these appearances are critical
stages. One solution may be to decide that all initial appearances
are critical stages, and there is plenty of evidence to suggest that
they are. Another solution may be to adopt risk-based bail reform,
which would allow Georgia to decrease the number of pretrial
detainees and perhaps make it easier to provide counsel for those
defendants who are actually detained. This Note acknowledges the
benefits of both options but, primarily, concludes that Georgia
simply cannot leave its “critical stage” question unanswered much
longer. Georgia has acknowledged that some initial appearances are
critical stages—now, it must decide how many, and take actions to
provide defendants the counsel to which they are entitled.

135

O’Kelley, 604 S.E.2d at 512.
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